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12 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 31

SHOPPING FOR REVERSALS:
How Accuracy Differs Across Patent Litigation Forums
Teresa Lii*
This study analyzes the rate of reversal on appeal of each district court for the most
popular patent litigation forums in the United States. Alarmingly, this study finds that district
courts which have been shopped for by litigants may also be the courts that are most often
applying patent law erroneously. Among these districts is the notoriously patentee-friendly
Eastern District of Texas, which has attracted huge volumes of litigants to its dockets in recent
years.
Although forum shopping has always antagonized the fairness of civil proceedings, it is
of special problem in the context of patent litigation. Where billions of dollars may be at stake
for companies being sued for patent infringement, the equal, fair and standardized application of
patent law is especially important. However, this study finds that district courts may be applying
patent law incorrectly at very different rates, with some courts being reversed on appeal at much
higher rates than others. Because the most popular courts, those that have been “shopped” for,
also appear to be the courts that are most frequently applying the law incorrectly, in those courts
there is much greater risk of expenses and inefficiencies associated with the appeals and relitigation of remanded cases, and the lack of assurance in not knowing whether the law has been
correctly applied in any one case. This study can bring more certainty to patent litigators,
shedding more light on the effect that litigating in a particular forum may have on the ultimate
outcome of a patent case.

*

J.D. Candidate, 2013, Columbia Law School. The author would like to thank Professor Ronald Mann for his inputs
and advice on empirical studies, Timothy Li and Jeremy Xia.

Introduction
Apple, Yahoo!, Google, Microsoft, Sony, Cingular, FedEx, Nokia, Samsung, 3M, Oracle,
Skype, Wal-Mart, Honeywell, Nissan, Hyundai, Morgan Stanley, Verizon, Acer, Nintendo,
Genentech. And the docket goes on.
This is not a list of the most profitable and well-known companies in the United States of
America, although certainly most of them are Fortune 500 household names. It is not a list of the
companies with the most advanced technologies or sophisticated products. Rather, it is a list of
companies that have been sued, in only the past three years, for patent infringement. Another
thing that these companies have in common is that they were all forced to litigate their patent
infringement cases in the Eastern District of Texas.
For a company like Apple, worth more than $508 billion in stock,1 getting the law right in
a patent case that could be worth $1.67 billion2 is important. Getting the law right in several
patent suits that could potentially all be worth that amount is even more important. This is the
situation that these companies are now facing. Yet, because of the notoriously high reversal rate
attributed to patent litigation, said to be as high as 53%,3 none of these companies can ever be
certain that the law will be properly applied to their cases.
While many studies have attempted to pin down the precise rate of reversal for various
types of patent cases, no study has yet researched the differential rates of reversal of different
district courts. This type of research, in light of the recent phenomenon of patent litigation forum
shopping,4 is all the more relevant to today’s patent world. While certain forums, such as the
Eastern District of Texas, have become spectacularly popular for litigation, 5 there is little
evidence that they are getting the law right – i.e., applying the law accurately, in most cases.6
The idea that a single popular district, deciding a plurality of all patent cases, could be applying
the law incorrectly in around half of its cases is simply frightening. This is especially true in the
context of the huge damages verdicts or even settlement amounts determined from what could be
an incorrect application of the law.
This study analyzes the rate of reversal on appeal to the Federal Circuit of each district
court for the most popular patent litigation forums in the United States. A high rate of reversal is
presumed to imply low accuracy. Alarmingly, this study finds that the most populated and wellknown district courts may also be the courts that are most often applying patent law inaccurately.
1

Zoe Fox, How Much is Apple Worth?, Mashable Business (May 02, 2012) http://mashable.com/2012/05/02/appleworth/ (last visited June 16, 2012).
2
William McQuillen, Abbott Told to Pay Record $1.67 Billion Award to J&J, Bloomberg L.P. (June 29, 2009 9:32
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aF0Qoxe0JCiw (last visited June 16, 2012).
3
Cyber Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J., dissenting).
4
Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). Forum shopping is defined as the “practice of choosing the most favorable
jurisdiction or court in which a claim might be heard.”
5
Yan Leychkis, Note, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the Meteoric Rise of the Eastern
District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 Yale J.L. & Tech. 193, 204 (2007).
6
In this study, “accuracy” is construed to mean “in accordance with the Federal Circuit”. This terminology can
certainly be contested, but as the Federal Circuit has final say in most patent cases, it will be accepted for this study.

These courts include the Eastern District of Texas and the District of Delaware, which may both
merit further study and investigation, to discover the factors leading to such high rates of reversal.
Part I provides a brief history of forum shopping within patent litigation. Part II analyzes
forum shopping within the context of the Eastern District of Texas, which has exploded in
popularity for patent litigation in the last decade. Part III then investigates the current statistics
on patent litigation accuracy, and addresses the specific problems it perpetuates. Part IV provides
the data and results of an empirical study to determine the rate of reversal on appeal of the
busiest patent litigation dockets in the United States, and analyzes the rates for significance with
respect to the average rate of reversal for all dockets.
I. History of Forum Shopping in Patent Litigation
Patent litigators have long known that not all district courts were created equal. Patent
law is governed by federal statute under Title 35 of the United States Code, 7 and therefore
presents a federal question that is almost always litigated in federal district courts. 8 This, in
addition to the long reach of patent jurisdictional and venue rules, means that patent litigants can
potentially be hailed into any forum to answer for patent-related claims.9 Yet, patent litigation
has remained concentrated in just a few courts across the nation.10
In an ideal world, because of the federal jurisdiction that governs it, patent law would be
a uniform body of law, with district court judges taking their mandates from Title 35 and clear
case law precedent. 11 Perhaps the most important source of precedent in the world of patent
litigation is the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. This Court was created
out of a Congressional desire for patent law uniformity across district courts. 12 Indeed, an
empirical study by David Krohn and Emerson Tiller has established that Federal Circuit case law
is more frequently cited in patent litigation, and thus presumably more authoritative, than
Supreme Court patent case law. 13 However, although the Federal Circuit has considerably
7

35 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any
Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks. No State court shall have
jurisdiction over any claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection,
or copyrights.”)
9
See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985) (finding federal jurisdiction under a broad set of
standards.)
10
See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C.
L. Rev. 889, 9003 (2001) (finding that “most patent cases are brought in only a handful of jurisdictions.”)
11
Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1619,
1620 (2007).
12
The Federal Circuit itself has commented on this mandate:
The purpose of this Court’s enabling act, the Federal Courts Improvement Act
of 1982 . . . is to provide a forum that will increase doctrinal stability in the field
of patent law . . . This Court was created, as contemplated by the Congress, to
achieve uniformity and to reduce uncertainties in this area.
Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1573–74 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (internal citation and
punctuation omitted).
13
David R. Pekarek Krohn & Emerson H. Tiller, Federal Circuit Patent Precedent: An Empirical Study of
Institutional Authority and IP Ideology, 3, Faculty Working Papers, Paper 42, 3
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/facultyworkingpapers/42 (“Using a variety of citation approaches
8

reduced the “plethora of appellate forums and often-conflicting precedents for patent
infringement actions,” it has still failed to establish such complete uniformity in patent law.14
Forum shopping remains rampant in patent litigation, with studies showing that the majority of
patent litigation is concentrated in a mere handful of district courts.15
Built into the United States Code is the option for litigants to pick and choose precisely
which forum is most convenient for the bringing of a lawsuit. This fact has been central to the
explosion of forum shopping in present-day patent litigation. According to the United States
Code, a patent suit may be brought in any venue in which (1) the defendant resides, or (2) where
the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of
business.16 Prior to 1957, Supreme Court precedent held that patent litigation was exclusively
governed by § 1400(b) and not broadened by the application of § 1391(c). 17 In the case of a
corporate defendant, therefore, the only available forum was the one in which the defendant was
incorporated.18 This limitation, until recently, presumably acted as some measure of deterrent to
forum shopping in patent litigation.19
However, in 1988, Congress amended § 1391(c) to state that a corporate defendant “shall
be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the
time the action is commenced.”20 Two years later, the Federal Circuit held in VE Holding Corp.
v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co. that this new definition of “reside” applied not only to the general
venue statute of § 1391, but also to the patent litigation statute of § 1400(b).21 Patent plaintiffs,
then, were suddenly allowed to bring their suits in any district in which a corporate defendant
had sufficient minimum contacts so as not to violate traditional notions of fair play and justice.22

and statistical tests, we find that federal district courts treat the Federal Circuit as more authoritative (compared to
the Supreme Court) on patent law, than they treat the regional circuits (compared to the Supreme Court) on
copyright law.”)
14
Ted Sichelman, Myths of (Un)Certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L. REV. 1161, 1165–71 (2010).
15
Moore, supra note 10, at 902–03.
16
28 U.S.C. § 1400 (b) (“Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the
defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established
place of business.”)
17
Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 229 (1957) (Prior to 1988 amendments, § 1391(c)
read only that “A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do
business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for
venue purposes.”)
18
See Manchester Modes, Inc. v. Schuman, 426 F.2d 629, 632 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that “we find it exceedingly
hard to believe Congress had any idea that by enacting § 1391(c) it was allowing a corporation which did business in
a multitude of districts to sue in any of them irrespective of the residence of the defendant.”)
19
See VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1575, 1582-83 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting that “the
‘freezing’ of patent venue as a result of Fourco has made patent venue an anomaly” by “unduly shield[ing] a
corporate infringer.”) (internal citation omitted). See also Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1444
(2010) (arguing that restricting venue in patent litigation to a defendant’s principal place of business would decrease
on forum shopping).
20
28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).
21
See VE Holding Corp., 917 F.2d at 1583–84 (holding that, for patent-related civil suits that did not involve
infringement claims (e.g. a declaratory judgment suit), the general venue statute of § 1391 applies.)
22
See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (setting out the present-day test for personal
jurisdiction requiring a defendant to have minimum contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantive justice).

For all practical purposes, this meant that the doors to every district court in America had been
thrown wide open to patent litigation.
Yet, litigants soon found that jurisdictional equality in patent litigation was not to be had.
In then-Professor, now Judge, Kimberly Moore’s landmark 2001 empirical study of forum
shopping in patent litigation, she confirmed what many already suspected: nearly 50% of all
patent litigation was concentrated in a mere ten district courts. 23 Among the top five “chosen”
districts were the Central District of California, the Northern District of California, and the
Southern District of New York.24 Furthermore, the concentration of litigation in these district
courts was disproportionately high relative to each of these forums’ general populations,
suggesting that the large numbers of patent suits filed in these districts could not be explained
simply by their large populations.25
In Moore’s study, she noted that plaintiffs were attracted to different forums for a variety
of reasons, including, but not limited to, perceived favorability to patentees.26 In the Eastern
District of Virginia, for example, she postulated that plaintiffs there were attracted to the
relatively short litigation resolution time of 0.43 years.27 Regardless of the reasons for plaintiffs’
affinities for each district, forum shopping was rampant, suggesting that the Federal Circuit had
failed to achieve its goal of uniformity in patent law.28
II. The Eastern District of Texas: A Case Study in Present-Day Forum Shopping
Forum shopping remains alive and well today.29 However, as early as 2006, the busiest
district courts were no longer precisely the same as those identified by Moore.30 Certain districts
are still highly prominent in patent litigation, including the Southern District of New York, the
Eastern District of Virginia, and the District of New Jersey. 31 Others, including the Southern
District of Florida and the District of Minnesota have decreased in traffic, while the Northern
District of Illinois has decreased in importance. 32 Perhaps the most important development,
23

Moore, supra note 10, at 902–03.
Id.
25
Id. at 904.
26
See id. at 916–17 (In Judge Moore’s study, patentees prevailed in 58% of all patent cases from 1995 to 1999.
However, some of the busiest districts, including the Districts of Massachusetts and Delaware, evidenced relatively
low patentee win rates. Thus, the favorability of a particular forum to the patentee (and plaintiff, and thus forum
selector in most situations) could not explain all instances of forum shopping.); contra, Scott Atkinson, Alan Marco
& John Turner, The Economics of a Centralized Judiciary: Uniformity, Forum Shopping, and the Federal Circuit,
52 J.L. & Econ. 411, 438 (2009) (a 2009 study arguing that forum shopping on the basis of validity rates ceased in
the 1970s.) As will be discussed infra, Moore found that forum shopping in her study was the result of a variety of
factors that may or may not include a forum’s patent validity rates.
27
See id. at 907–08.
28
See id. at 893.
29
See e.g. Chester S. Chuang, Offensive Venue: The Curious Use of Declaratory Judgment to Forum Shop in Patent
Litigation, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1065,(2012); Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38:4 AIPLA Q.J.
1 (2010); Roderick R. McKelvie, Forum Selection in Patent Litigation: A Traffic Report for 2006, Covington &
Burling (2007); Alisha K. Taylor, Note, What Does Forum Shopping in the Eastern District of Texas Mean for
Patent Reform?, 6 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 570 (2007)..
30
See McKelvie, supra note 30, at 2 (listing the top ten districts for patent filings in fiscal year 2006).
31
See Lemley, supra note 30, at 6.
32
Id.
24

however, is the rise of the Eastern District of Texas as the newest, and most notorious, go-to
forum for patent plaintiffs.33
This forum, a so-called “rocket docket” 34 has been hailed as the answer to litigants’
prayers for speedy, efficient, and overwhelmingly plaintiff-friendly relief.35 The Eastern District
of Texas’s appeal lies chiefly in two factors: the speed and efficiency of its local patent litigation
rules, and its perceived favorability to plaintiffs in terms of verdicts and verdict amounts.36
In the first instance, the Eastern District of Texas has adopted a specialized set of patent
litigation rules that lays out stringent requirements for the submission of documents. These rules
and deadlines are meant to hurry along the normally arduous road to trial. 37 Soon after the
commencement of litigation, each party must submit preliminary documents that restrict the
litigation to the listed claims and patents.38 Parties must also confer to develop a “Joint Claim
Construction and Prehearing Statement” setting forth the construction of the undisputed claim
terms, as well as each party’s proposed construction for the disputed terms.39 The enforcement of
strict deadlines has considerably lowered the average time to trial in the Eastern District of Texas
relative to the national averages in both bench and jury trial situations.40 The Eastern District of
Texas promises speedier resolution of patent infringement cases, thereby offering potential
plaintiffs the promise of being able to save on legal fees and litigation costs. Additionally, these
rules may also confer a distinct advantage to the plaintiff-patentee, who prepares in advance of

33

See id.; Leychkis, supra note 5, at 204; Taylor, supra note 30, at 580–82.
Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). A rocket docket is defined as: “A court or judicial district known for its
speedy disposition of cases.”
35
See Leychkis, supra note 5; Taylor, supra note 29; see also Alan Cohen, From PI to IP, IP L. & Bus., Nov. 2005
at 36; Bob Cote & Rodger Sadler, Survival Strategies in the New IP Economy, Managing Intell. Prop., at 26, June
2006.
36
See Leychkis, supra note 5, at 232 (“While some commentators have praised the Eastern District for the expertise
of its judges, the special patent rules, and the quick adjudication of patent disputes, others have raised concerns over
the abnormally high plaintiffs' win rate and the highly attenuated connections between many of the litigants and the
district.”).
37
Local Rules for the Eastern District of Texas: Appendix M Patent Rules, available at
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/view_document.cgi?document=1179&download=true [hereafter E.D. of Tex.
Rules]; see also Andrei Iancu & Jay Chung, Real Reasons the Eastern District of Texas Draws Patent Cases—
Beyond Lore and Anecdote, 14 SMU Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 299 (2011).
38
E.D. of Tex. Rules, supra note 37, at 3-1–3-6(At the start of litigation, each party must submit a document
including all “Infringement Contentions” and all “Invalidity Contentions,” which are then generally deemed to be
that party’s final contentions throughout trial.)
39
Id. at 4-3.
40
Shahnaz Mahmud, See Y’all Real Soon!, Managing Intell. Prop., Oct. 2006 (reporting that, on average, bench
trials in the Eastern District of Texas resolve in 22.3 months compared to 37.8 months nationwide, while jury trials
resolve in 21.1 months compared to 27.1 months nationwide). But see Tresa Baldas, Texas IP Rocket Docket
Headed for Burnout?, Nat’l L.J., Dec. 28, 2004 (commenting that the average time to trial in the Eastern District of
Texas has increased as the patent dockets are flooded by new cases); see also U.S. District Courts Civil Cases
Commenced, By Nature of Suit and District, Judicial Business of the United States Courts, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness.aspx (a comparison of Table C-10 (or T-3 in later years) from
various years showing that the median time from filing to trial in the Eastern District of Texas has been steadily
increasing since 2004).
34

filing suit in this forum with well-prepared litigation materials, against the defendant-infringer,
who must then scramble to meet the deadlines and shortened litigation schedule.41
However, the local patent rules alone do not explain all of the Eastern District of Texas’s
appeal. Other district courts have adopted similar rules, but have failed to attract the same
amount of patent litigation.42 The second reason for this forum’s popularity is that the Eastern
District of Texas has gained a reputation for being overwhelmingly plaintiff-friendly, in both the
likelihood of a verdict favoring the plaintiff, as well as the size of the damages awarded to that
plaintiff.43 One study has reported an average plaintiff win rate as high as 92% for this district;44
as compared to a national average between 59% 45 –68%, 46 this statistic can easily explain a
would-be plaintiff’s attraction to this forum.
Furthermore, plaintiffs can look forward not only to favorable verdicts, but also “Texassized” damages awards.47 For example, a jury in this district awarded the jaw-dropping amount
of $1.67 billion to Centocor, Inc., a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson, in a patent infringement
suit against Abbott Laboratories—the largest patent infringement verdict ever.48 Such verdicts
are generally attributed to the plaintiff-friendly juries, because these juries reportedly display
trust in the government’s decisions about its property, manifested in the presumption of validity
for a patent granted to a patentee-plaintiff by the United States Patent and Trademark Office.49
Thus, a jury in the Eastern District of Texas may be relatively more likely than a jury in other
districts to award large damages against corporate infringer-defendants. This high plaintiff win
rate also means that even a plaintiff with a shaky case will be incentivized to file in this forum, in
hopes of pressuring the defendant into favorable settlement negotiations in an effort to deter the
enormous costs of litigation.50

41

See Leychkis, supra note 5, at 209 (noting that defendants in the Eastern District of Texas only receive nine
months to complete discovery, which somewhat biases the system toward plaintiffs).
42
The Western District of Pennsylvania, for example, adopted similar rules in 2005, United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania, Local Patent Rules, available online at
http://www.pawd.uscourts.gov/Documents/Forms/LocalPatentRules.pdf. However, the number of patent filings in
that district has not significantly increased; see U.S. District Courts Civil Cases Commenced, By Nature of Suit and
District, Judicial Business of the United States Courts, supra note 40.
43
See Julie Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 2006.
44
Cote & Sadler, supra note 35, at 26. See also Creswell, supra note 43 (reporting a plaintiff win rate of 78% in the
Eastern District of Texas according to LegalMetric data).
45
Creswell, supra note 43 (reported according to LegalMetric data).
46
See Cohen, supra note 35 (reported according to LegalMetric data).
47
Creswell, supra note 43.
48
See McQuillen, supra note 2. This verdict was later thrown out on appeal when the Federal Circuit invalidated the
patent at issue. Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 636 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011). However, the size of
the verdict remains a testament to this forum’s willingness to award damages in unprecedented amounts.
49
See Susan Decker, Texas District is Heaven for Patent Holders Under Siege, Seattle Times, May 1, 2006 (quoting
Judge Ward to say that “[p]roperty rights and respect for government resonate particularly strongly in East Texas”).
50
See Creswell, supra note 43 (“Those odds are daunting enough to encourage many corporate defendants to settle
before setting foot in Marshall”); see also Am. Intell. Prop. Law Ass’n, Report of the Economic Survey (2009)
(Patent suits with more than $1 million at issue generally cost between $3 million and $6 million to litigate, so it is
not unreasonable that a defendant would prefer to settle rather than carry a case to trial and bear attorney, expert
witness and other related costs.).

The aforementioned overwhelming rate of plaintiff-friendliness in the Eastern District of
Texas, relative to other district courts raises an immediate red flag when compared to the lower
plaintiff win rates exhibited by other districts. Even more cause for suspicion is that studies have
found that, between 2002-2004, patentee-plaintiffs in other districts were usually less likely than
defendants to prevail in patent infringement suits.51 Those that did prevail, usually appeared to be
in strong financial shape, with financial support at least equivalent to the accused infringerdefendant.52 In the Eastern District of Texas, where many patentee-plaintiffs are non-practicing
entities (pejoratively termed “patent trolls”) whose primary assets are patents,53 it seems unlikely
that plaintiffs fulfill this correlational condition. Regardless of the reasons why, there is no
question that the Eastern District of Texas has prominently displayed a welcome mat to plaintiffs
who desire a speedy and favorable resolution to their patent claims, and which may have led to
some of this highly anomalous behavior.
Speed and plaintiff-friendliness can be reasonable justifications for seeking a forum with
a fast-moving docket.54 For these reasons, forum shopping, as the Fourth Circuit has noted, may
not be inherently evil.55 Even the Supreme Court has spoken on the issue, remarking that even
without resorting to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),56 a plaintiff always has the option of “shopping for a
forum with the most favorable law.”57 Thus, there is a general, if resigned, recognition that some
degree of forum shopping will be inevitable in the American legal system. However,
commentators have recognized a multitude of problems that may ensue from forum shopping in
patent litigation.58 Among these are issues of inefficiency.59 If the application of patent law is
inconsistent across litigation forums, the resulting uncertainty regarding the scope of patent
holders’ scopes of exclusivity will divert resources away from invention of new patents to
enforcement of existing patents.60 Furthermore, as litigants battle over which forum is the most
appropriate for each patent suit, inefficiencies and costs associated with venue fights will
accrue.61 Finally, the greatest concern is that of fairness. This may pose a special problem in
patent litigation, an area of the law that is already riddled with inaccuracy, by perpetuating and
magnifying erroneous applications of the law.
51

See Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 1 (2006).
Id. at 26.
53
Creswell, supra note 43.
54
See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Reconceiving the Patent Rocket Docket: An Empirical Study of Infringement
Litigation 1985–2000, 11 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 58, 61–70 (2011) (arguing that litigants are attracted to
different rocket dockets for various reasons, including speed, efficiency and reputation for plaintiff-friendliness).
55
Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 512 n.12 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Richard Maloy, Forum Shopping? What’s
Wrong with That?, 24 Q.L.R. 25, 25 (2005); Stowell R. R. Kelner, Note, “Adrift on an Uncharted Sea”: A Survey of
Section 1404(a) Transfer in the Federal System, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 612, 638 (1992).
56
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) authorizes a district court to transfer a case to any other district or division where it might
have been brought “[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.”
57
See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 527 (1990); see also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770,
779 (1984) (upholding plaintiff forum shopping for a favorable statute of limitations because it was akin to forum
shopping for favorable substantive or procedural rules, or jury pool).
58
Carter G. Phillips, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Lecture, 66 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1467, 1472 (2009) (remarking that
forum shopping is “already a serious problem in patent litigation”).
59
Moore, supra note 10, at 924.
60
Moore, supra note 10, at 928.
61
Id. at 926; see also David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute: Part II, 36 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 268, 307 (1969) (writing that “[t]he theory [of venue transfer] is good, but it is practically unworkable . . .
deciding where the [most convenient] forum is costs altogether too much time and money.”).
52

III. The Special Problem of Accuracy in Patent Litigation
Forum shopping confounds and complicates litigation by selectively creating pockets of
district courts that apply the law in a nonuniform manner. This is in addition to the problem that
patent suits already face of accurate application of the law. The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that patent law is an extremely complex field, especially for those without training
in science and technology.62 Most frequently, district court judges, who must manage their patent
dockets and decide essential issues of patent law, usually do not have such training in science
and technology.63 This lack of special training in those who have been appointed to adjudicate
this field may make patent law especially volatile and inaccurate.
Contributing to this impression is a widespread belief that patent litigation exhibits the
highest reversal rates out of all types of civil litigation.64 Numerous studies have detailed the
high rates of reversal and unpredictable results of patent litigation holdings on appeal, with a
multitude of studies citing a reversal rate between 30–50% for claim construction.65 The Federal
Circuit publishes its own statistics on the rate of U.S. District Court decision reversals, with
annual averages generally ranging between 10–20%. 66 However, these rates do not seem to
differentiate between patent cases and other types of cases. Furthermore, these statistics most
likely include rulings on motions and other types of dispositions, but do not include partial
affirmances that result in remands, and as such are not a wholly accurate reflection of the Federal
Circuit’s reversal rate on patent issues.67 Thus, Chief Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit may not

62

Blonder-Tongue Labs, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 331 (1971) (“[P]atent litigation can present issues
so complex that legal minds, without appropriate grounding science and technology, may have difficulty in reaching
decision.”)
63
James F. Holderman & Halley Guren, The Patent Litigation Predicament in the United States, 2007 U. Ill. J.L.
Tech. & Pol’y 1, 105-106 (outlining several reasons, including a lack of scientific backgrounds or special training in
patent law, why district judges struggle with patent cases as generalists of the law).
64
See Sichelman, supra note 14, at 1173 (comparing the relatively high reversal rate of patent litigation (claim
construction cases not resulting in summary affirmances) to the average reversal rate of 26.2% for all types of civil
litigation combined (citing Corey Rayburn Yung, Flexing Judicial Muscle: An Empirical Study of Judicial Activism
in the Federal Courts, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (2011))).
65
See, e.g., Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The Time is Ripe for a
Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. Intell. Prop. L. 175, 205 (2001) (reporting a 40% reversal rate for
claim constructions); Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends, 16
Berkeley Tech. L. J. 1075, 1092 (Fall 2001) (finding a 44% reversal rate over a 28 month period from Jan 1998 to
March 2000); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 Harv. J.L. &
Tech. 1 (2001) (reporting a 33% reversal rate for claim construction from 1993 to 1998); Sichelman, supra note 14,
at 1186–88 (reporting a “relatively high 30 to 35 percent” overall reversal rate, with claim constructions being
reversed at much higher rates than other issues at 40-50%); Andrew T. Zidel, Patent Claim Construction in the Trial
Courts: A Study Showing the Need for Clear Guidance From the Federal Circuit, 33 Seton Hall L. Rev. 711, 746
(2003) (reporting a 41.5% claim construction reversal rate on appeal exclusively in 2001); but see Ronald J. Mann &
Marian Underweiser, A New Look at Patent Qualify: Relating Patent Prosecution to Validity, 9 J. Emp. Legal Stud.
1 (2012) (reporting a11% reversal rate for Judge Mayer, 35% for Judge Dyk, in patent validity cases since 2003);
Sichelman, supra note 14, at 1175 (“the average reversal rate across all issues other than claim construction is 18
percent,” suggesting that other issues of patent law are not nearly as indeterminate or inconsistently applied as claim
construction).
66
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending, available at
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/statistics.html.
67
Sichelman, supra note 14, at 1186.

have been exaggerating when he wrote that the patent “reversal rate, hovering near 50%, is the
worst possible. Even a rate that was much higher would provide greater certainty.”68
Claim construction may simply be a particularly vague and indeterminate area of patent
law, 69 a problem which is further compounded by the fact that it is reviewed on a de novo
standard on appeal.70 Unfortunately, because claim construction defines the scope and meaning
of the patent at issue, most patent cases settle after a claim construction hearing, when the parties
have gained some idea of how a court will ultimately rule on the merits of the case. 71
Furthermore, because claim construction is often performed at an early stage in a patent suit,
errors at this early stage are amplified in later stages of the litigation proceedings, ultimately
impacting future determinations of invalidity or infringement.72 Therefore, the high reversal rate
for claim construction is still a cause for alarm, as it implies that many settlements are affected
by a faulty claim construction. The high reversal rate for claim construction alone, then, may
speak to a general judicial inability to properly apply and utilize patent law.
Regardless of the origins, it should be alarming to patent litigation practitioners and
litigants, and especially to defendants, that patent litigation has such a reputation as being so
error-prone and unpredictable. Judge Holderman of the Northern District of Illinois lamented
that “[t]his unpredictability may encourage litigants . . . (1) to pursue the litigation process to the
hilt through expensive discovery, pretrial proceedings, trial and appeal or (2) in the alternative, to
settle early a case upon which they may have otherwise prevailed to minimize the costs of
litigation.” 73 Chief Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit additionally remarked that the vast
expenses of litigation “can force accused infringers to acquiesce to non-meritorious claims.”74
This is a problem on several fronts. First, for the cases that actually go to trial, it is
obvious that inaccurate application of the law results in the setting of inaccurate precedent that,
accumulated, will have an increasingly skewing and negative effect on the entire body of patent
law. This may be the case even though some cases may be reversed on appeal, because 95% of
patent suits never make it to trial, 75 and instead settle, most likely at least partly under the
shadow of case law precedent.76 If this precedent is inaccurate, then a certain percentage of those
68
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cases will have settled because one party was given a legally-inaccurate – that is, a legally
uncertain – advantage.77 This may encourage more litigants to file suits with little or no merit.78
To take such issues to their practical conclusions, for patent plaintiffs, winning a suit in a
district exhibiting a high rate of reversal does not mean that the litigation is over; rather, it
indicates that the judgment has a high likelihood of being overturned on appeal. On the other
hand, a defendant may feel pressured to settle a patent case to avoid the high costs of litigation,
even if the defendant’s case could win on the merits, due to the great uncertainties stemming
from high rates of reversal in the district court where that case has been filed. In turn, the
American legal system will be confounded by excessive litigation and legal inefficiencies, as
district courts attempt again and again to correctly interpret and apply patent law and are
reversed again and again on appeal, despite the fact that “Intellectual Property cases” already
cost 62% higher than other types of civil litigation.79 Therefore, any patent litigator preparing to
file or defend a suit in a particular forum would rightly be concerned to discover that that forum
exhibits a high rate of reversal.
IV. Empirical Analysis of Patent Litigation Reversal Rates by District Court
In order to more deeply study the effect of forum shopping on the accuracy of patent
litigation, an empirical study was performed to test the reversal rate of each of the busiest
districts for patent litigation. A high rate of reversal presumably implies that a certain forum is
applying the law incorrectly, while a low rate of reversal would imply that that forum is more
accurate. First, the twenty busiest districts for patent litigation were identified, and the rate of
reversal was determined for each of these district courts. Then, statistical analysis was performed
on the collected data to determine whether and in which districts the rate of reversal was
significantly different at the 95% confidence level from the overall rate of reversal of all courts
studied.80
A. Dataset and Methodology
In order to identify the busiest districts for patent litigation, the origin of each case in the
four most recent bound volumes, volumes 93 through 96, of the United States Patent Quarterly,
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was recorded, and the totals for each district were tabulated. Only cases that dealt with patents
and that were decided on the merits of the patent-in-suit were included. The twenty courts with
the most cases were selected for further study.
For each district court, the rate of reversal was then studied. The dataset originated from
WestlawNext,81 by searching the name of the district court in the Federal Circuit database. Each
case originating from that court that was decided by the Federal Circuit between March 2012 and
January 2009,82 inclusive, was recorded, as long as it dealt with patents and was decided on the
merits of the patent-in-suit.83 Cases that were affirmed, including summary affirmances, were
recorded as “Affirmed,” and cases that were reversed either in part or in whole were recorded as
“Reversed.” Cases wherein the Federal Circuit’s decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court
were included as “Affirmed,” while cases where the Federal Circuit’s decision was reversed
were excluded from the dataset.84 When all of the cases had been collected, the percentage of
cases marked as reversed was then calculated for each district court.
Statistical analysis was then performed to determine whether the rate of reversal was
significant for each district in comparison to the overall rate of reversal. Two types of tests of
two proportions were utilized. First, the rate of reversal of each district court was tested against
the overall weighted average rate of reversal of all cases studied, to determine whether that
district’s rate of reversal was significantly different from the rate in all districts studied. The
second type tested the rate of reversal of each district court against the rate of reversal of all
courts summed, minus that court, to ensure that the first test did not give disproportionate weight
to that district court in calculating the overall rate of reversal.
B. Results
The twenty busiest district courts selected are shown in Figure 1 below, with the
respective number of cases in the USPQ, volumes 93–96. Notable for the large amount of
appeals from that court are the Eastern District of Texas (thirteen cases), the District of Delaware
(ten cases), the Central District of California (nine cases), and the Eastern District of Virginia
and the Southern District of New York (eight cases each). At the other end of the spectrum, with
only two appeals each, are the District of Arizona, the Eastern District of New York, the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, and the Northern District of Illinois.
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Fig. 1. Twenty busiest district courts selected for further study from the USPQ,
shown with their respective number of cases from volumes 93-96 of the USPQ.
For each of the district courts, the cases tabulated from the WestlawNext search are
summarized below. The Eastern District of Texas was the origin of 49 cases, the most out of all
the districts studied, with the Central District of California (45 cases), the District of Delaware
(43 cases) and the Northern District of California (40 cases) following closely behind. The
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Eastern District of New York and the District of Colorado
exhibited the lowest numbers of cases on appeal, at only three cases each.

Fig. 2. Number of cases found in WestlawNext to determine rate of reversal on appeal.
The rate of reversal for each district court yielding more than ten cases on appeal based
on the cases summarized in Figure 2 is shown below. The courts with the highest rate of reversal
include the District of Massachusetts (61.5%), the Eastern District of Texas (55.1%), and the

District of Delaware (51.2%). 85 The court with the lowest rate of reversal was the Northern
District of Illinois, at only 16%. The weighted average rate of reversal was 37.8%, while the nonweighted average was 40.8%.86 For purposes of the creation of this chart, only cases exhibiting
more than ten cases on appeal are shown, although all districts were included for purposes of
calculating the average and weighted average rate of reversal on appeal. 87

Fig. 3. Rate of reversal on appeal for each district court for cases decided between
January 2009 and March 2012, showing the districts with ten or more cases.
The results of significance testing are summarized below in Figure 4. Because the results
were not significantly different for testing against the overall average and testing against all
districts excluding the tested district, meaning that the exclusion of a single district would not
impact the test significantly, only the results for the former test are shown.
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District
P-Score v. Overall Average Rate of Reversal
Eastern District of Texas
0.022
Massachusetts
0.084
Delaware
0.096
District of Columbia
0.551
Southern District of Texas
0.887
Northern District of California
0.501
New Jersey
0.550
Central District of California
0.218
Southern District of New York
0.285
Western District of Wisconsin
0.442
Southern District of Florida
0.251
Eastern District of Virginia
0.251
Northern District of Illinois
0.005
Fig. 4. Significance testing against both weighted average rate of reversal and average of
district courts not including the tested court.
As highlighted in the chart, only two district courts had a reversal rate that was
significantly different from the average reversal rate.88 The Eastern District of Texas exhibited
right-tailed significance, which means that the rate of reversal was significantly not lower than
the overall rate, while the Northern District of Illinois exhibited left-tailed significance, meaning
that its rate of reversal was significantly not higher than the overall rate. 89 In other words, the
Eastern District of Texas had a rate of reversal that was most likely significantly higher than the
overall average rate of reversal, while the Northern District of Illinois had a rate that was most
likely significantly lower. This result is particularly interesting, as it confirms the negative
impression that has been detailed above regarding the Eastern District of Texas with all of its
notoriety: despite the plaintiff-friendliness and speed with which this district resolves cases, and
which has drawn litigants to it, it may well be that this district is more inaccurate at applying
patent law than other districts.
As an additional method of analyzing the data, the hypothetical total number of cases that
would be reversed from each district, were all cases to be appealed, was calculated. The result of
this calculation will be termed the meta-reversal number. This number is important as it allows
for an estimate of just how many patent cases are being adjudicated erroneously each year.
District courts may have highly variable rates of appeal, which would mean that from each
district, the raw rate of reversal may not be wholly indicative of exactly how many cases are
88
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being wrongly decided from each district. Thus, for example, if the rate of reversal for District A
was 10%, but a total of 1000 cases was filed in District A, the meta-reversal number would be
100 cases; however, if District B’s rate of reversal was 50%, but only 100 cases were filed in
District B, then District B’s meta-reversal number would be 50 cases. Even though District B’s
rate of reversal is 50% as compared to District A’s 10%, District A would still exhibit a higher
number of cases that would hypothetically be reversed, if all of them were to be appealed. Thus,
District A would still be greater cause for concern to litigants and attorneys seeking a legallycorrect and valid judgment, as it would appear to yield a much higher raw number of incorrectly
adjudicated cases.
To calculate the meta-reversal number for each district, the total number of cases filed in
each district court in the time period examined by this study (August 2005 and December
2008)90 was multiplied by the rate of reversal. The results are shown in Figure 5 below. As is
evident in the chart, the meta-reversal numbers are similar to the raw rates of reversal. The
Eastern District of Texas and Delaware, two of the most popular patent litigation districts, have
the highest meta-reversal numbers, suggesting that these districts are adjudicating the largest
number of cases incorrectly. The District of Columbia, however, despite having a high raw rate
of reversal, does not contribute many incorrectly-decided cases to the overall number of cases
that are hypothetically decided wrongly every year, since very few cases are filed there.

Fig. 5. Total number of cases that would be reversed from each district if all cases are
appealed, showing courts with ten or more appeals.
From a combination of Figures 4 and 5, the Eastern District of Texas has both the highest
rate of reversal and the highest raw number of cases that is decided incorrectly (the meta-reversal
number). The District of Delaware may be another cause for concern, since both of these
numbers are high as well. Both of these districts may have disproportionately large impacts on
90

This was calculated by searching through each district court’s docket on BloombergLaw’s Docket Search for
patent cases that had been filed between August 2005 and December 2008, where the nature of the suit was marked
“Property Rights - Patent [*830].”

the nationwide total number of cases decided incorrectly, by contributing many cases to that
number. Not only do these districts decide many of their cases incorrectly, but they are also the
districts in which a large number of cases are litigated. Thus, they are the districts that are most
negatively impacting the accuracy of patent litigation outcomes. The District of Massachusetts,
despite having the highest rate of reversal in Figure 4, has a low meta-reversal, implying that it
probably does not adjudicate enough cases to have a large impact on the nationwide number of
cases that are hypothetically wrongly decided.
Finally, in order to test whether the rate of reversal was correlated with any of the
variables that are generally associated with patent litigation forums (such as time to trial and
patentee win rate), the reversal rates acquired in this study for all districts were graphed against
such variables on a scatterplot, and the R-squared value for each resulting trendline was
calculated.91 Variables were taken from Mark Lemley, “Where to File Your Patent Case,” and
included the time to trial, percent of cases going to trial, and patentee win rate. 92 Another
variable tested was the percent of cases appealed. This was calculated by searching through each
district court’s docket on BloombergLaw’s Docket Search for patent cases that had been filed
between August 2005 and December 200893 and had been appealed to the Federal Circuit at least
once. Additionally, the reversal rates were also graphed against the total number of cases pulled
for each district court, to ensure that there was no self-selection bias (i.e. that the courts with
more cases naturally had more reversals or less reversals). The graphs for this test can be found
in Appendix I. The only significant result, however, is that none of the variables showed any
correlation to the reversal rate.94 Therefore, the reversal rate cannot be explained by any other
variable. This suggests that the courts themselves may have special attributes which should be
studied in greater detail to ascertain the specific factors leading to high or low rates of reversal,
i.e., high or low rates of accuracy.
Conclusion
An empirical analysis of the reversal rate on appeal of the twenty busiest district courts
produced several significant results. First, the overall reversal rate among these courts is 37.8%,
which is similar to results that have been produced by previous case studies. Second, most of the
district courts produce reversal rates that are not significantly different from the overall average
within the top 20 districts. Only three district courts were significantly different from the average
rate at a two-tailed 95% confidence level. The reversal rate of the Northern District of Illinois
perhaps merits further study, as it appears to have achieved a significantly lower rate of reversal
than any of the other courts, including the Southern District of New York and the Northern
District of California, both of which are traditionally considered highly influential in patent law.
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Most importantly, the results show that the Eastern District of Texas is reversed on
appeal at an extremely high rate, comparatively, and is one of only two courts to exhibit a rate of
reversal that is significantly not lower than the average rate, at a two-tailed significance level.
Without further study, it is difficult to draw conclusions from this data. However, it means that
perhaps this district deserves its notorious reputation as being overly patentee-friendly – this very
patentee-friendliness, and the anomalous patterns of litigation that have been recorded from the
Eastern District of Texas, may in fact be lending themselves to a greater likelihood of
adjudicating cases inaccurately. If this were to be the case, then patentees would be well-advised
to be cautious when filing in this circuit, as its application of patent law, despite being friendlier
to plaintiffs, may ultimately be mistaken.
Finally, these reversal rates cannot be explained by any other variables traditionally
associated with reasons behind patent litigation forum shopping. This suggests that they are a
standalone phenomenon. In order to prevent further accumulation of needless costs and
inefficiencies, it may be wise to take note of them, as they surely deserve greater in-depth study.

Appendix I: Rate of reversal on appeal graphed against other potentially explanatory
variables.

Appendix II: Study Data
District

Total
Cases95

Total
Appeals

EDTX
CDCA
NJ
NDCA
DE
NDIL
SDNY
MA
SDCA
SDFL
EDMI
WDWI
MDFL
EDVA
EDPA
CO
AZ
EDNY
SDTX
DC

1030
911
550
548
519
486
383
219
219
205
204
203
186
162
149
132
125
119
109
84

90
70
38
35
68
17
32
19
25
25
19
41
8
20
6
5
4
7
10
16

95

% Cases Patentee Cases
Appealed Win
Going to
Rate96
Trial97
8.7%
40.3%
8.0%
7.7%
36.3%
1.5%
6.9%
21.0%
2.1%
6.4%
26.0%
3.1%
13.1%
45.3%
11.8%
3.5%
32.6%
1.6%
8.4%
37.0%
1.6%
8.7%
38.4%
6.2%
11.4%
27.3%
3.1%
12.2%
27.8%
4.4%
9.3%
25.0%
2.1%
20.2%
24.0%
7.4%
4.3%
46.3%
4.0%
12.3%
30.4%
6.4%
4.0%
27.3%
1.5%
3.8%
25.0%
2.2%
3.2%
30.3%
2.6%
5.9%
17.6%
0.9%
9.2%
29.3%
3.5%
19.0%
26.5%
0%

Time to
Trial
(years)98
1.24
0.89
1.14
1.28
1.05
0.95
1.12
1.29
1.03
0.83
1.10
0.56
0.89
0.64
1.32
0.88
1.28
1.13
1.06
1.14

Rate of
Reversal, Jan
2009-Mar 2012
55.10%
28.89%
32.00%
32.50%
51.16%
16.00%
27.27%
61.54%
50.00%
25.00%
22.22%
27.27%
50.00%
25.00%
66.67%
100.00%
25.00%
33.33%
40.00%
46.15%

“Total Cases” denotes all cases filed between July 2005 and August 2008, while “Total Appeals” denotes the
number of those cases that reported at least one appeal to the Federal Circuit. The data was obtained from
performing a Docket Search on Bloomberg Law, available at bloomberglaw.com, for all dockets that were
commenced in that date range, where the nature of the suit was marked “Property Rights - Patent [*830].”
96
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97
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Number
of Cases
in Study
49
45
25
40
43
25
22
13
4
16
9
11
6
16
3
3
4
3
10
13

